Selected Publications

Abstract:

Are non-practicing entities (NPEs) -- firms that specialize in the enforcement of patent rights rather than the commercialization of patented technologies -- more likely than other patent enforcers to behave opportunistically? To explore this question, we construct measures of opportunistic conduct by patent enforcers and document the presence or absence of these behaviors in a subset of U.S. patent cases in which opportunism is especially likely to occur: cases that assert standard essential patents (SEPs). Our results suggest heterogeneity across different opportunistic behaviors. NPEs are more likely to exploit the SEP-declaration process and the SEP market's lack of transparency, while practicing entities (PEs) are more likely to pursue bans on the sale and importation of their products. We additionally present evidence that opportunism can affect case outcomes. Declaration- and market-related opportunism are associated with a higher rate of settlement in NPE cases relative to PE cases.